In this comprehensive collection of essays, most of which appear for the first time, eminent scholars from many disciplines—philosophy, economics, sociology, political science, demography, theology, history, and social psychology—examine the causes, nature, and consequences of present-day consumption patterns in the United States and throughout the world.

Chambliss, J. J. The guardian, Plato.--Proussis, C. M. The orator, Isocrates.--Rexine, J. E. The Stoic, Zeno.--Kibre, P. The Christian, Augustine.--Donohue, J. W. The Scholastic, Aquinas.--Schacht, F. E. The classical humanist, Erasmus.--Clauser, J. K. The pansophist, Comenius.--Benne, K. D. The gentleman, Locke.--Ballinger, S. E. The natural man, Rousseau.--Bibby, C. The scientific humanist, Huxley.--Nyberg, P. The communal man, Marx.--Holmes, B. The reflective man, Dewey.--Bantock, G. H. The cultured man, Eliot.--Friedman, M. The existential man, Buber.--Aschner, M. J. M. The planned man, Skinner.

The guardian: Plato, by J. J. Champbliss.--The orator: Isocrates, by C. M. Proussis.--The Stoic: Zeno, by J. E. Rexine.--The Christian: Augustine, by P. Kibre.--The Scholastic: Aqkuinas, by J. W. Donohue.--The classical humanist: Erasmus, by F. E. Schacht.--The pansophist: Comenius, by J. K. Clauser.--The gentleman: Locke, by K. D. Benne.--The natural man: Rousseau, by S. E. Ballinger.--The scientific humanist: Huxley, by C. Bibby.--The communal man: Marx, by P. Nyberg.--The reflective man: Dewey, by B. Holmes.--The cultured man: Eliot, by G. H. Bantock.--The (...) existential man: Buber, by M. Friedman.--The planned man: Skinner, by M. J. M. Aschner. (shrink)

Corporate social responsibility (CSR) continues to gain attention atop the corporate agenda and is by now an important component of the dialogue between companies and their stakeholders. Nevertheless, there is still little guidance as to how companies can implement CSR activity in order to maximize returns to CSR investment. Theorists have identified many company-favoring outcomes of CSR; yet there is a dearth of research on the psychological mechanisms that drive stakeholder responses to CSR activity. Borrowing from the literatures on meansend (...) chains and relationship marketing, we propose a conceptual model that explains how CSR provides individual stakeholders with numerous benefits (functional, psychosocial, and values) and how the type and extent to which a stakeholder derives these benefits from CSR initiatives influences the quality of the relationship between the stakeholder and the company. The paper discusses the implications of these insights and highlights a number of areas for future research. (shrink)

What are the most fundamental features of the world? Do minds stand outside the natural order? Is a unified picture of mental and physical reality possible? The Mind in Nature provides a staunchly realist account of the world as a unified system incorporating both the mental and the physical.

The development of a compositional model shows the incoherence of such notions as levels of being and both bottom-up and top-down causality. The mathematization of nature through the partial considerations of physics qua quantities is seen to lead to Pythagoreanism, if what is not included in the partial consideration is denied. An ontology of only probabilities, if not Pythagoreanism, is equivalent to a world of primitive dispositionalities. Problems are found with each. There is a need for properties as well as (...) quantities and these properties must be qualitative as well as dispositional. So there is a need for physical qualia (qualities) for the depiction of the intrinsic character of the finest interstices of nature. (shrink)

While considerable attention has been given to the harm done to consumers by marketing, less attention has been given to the harm done by consumers as an indirect effect of marketing activities, particularly in regard to supply chains. The recent development of dramatically expanded global supply chains has resulted in social and environmental problems upstream that are attributable at least in part to downstream marketers and consumers. Marketers have responded mainly by using corporate social responsibility (CSR) communication to counter the (...) critique of CSR practice, but these claims of ethical corporate behavior often lack credibility and can result in a backlash against brands. The article argues that more adequate attention to the harmful upstream effects of downstream marketing and consumption decisions requires greater attention to stakeholder marketing and marketer efforts to help create responsible consumers. It concludes by identifying implications for further research in this important emergent area of marketing ethics. (shrink)

This paper examines the effects of employees’ sense that they work for a purpose-driven company on their workplace sustainability behaviors. Conceptualizing corporate purpose as an overarching, relevant, shared ethical vision of why a company exists and where it needs to go, we argue that it is particularly suited for driving employee sustainability behaviors, which are more ethically complex than the types of employee ethical behaviors typically examined by prior research. Through four studies, two involving the actual employees of construction companies, (...) we demonstrate that purpose drives the sustainability behaviors of employees by causing them to take psychological ownership of sustainability. In addition, we show that the sustainability-enhancing effect of purpose is stronger when employees perceive that they have higher autonomy in enacting their sustainability actions and for those employees for whom being moral is more central to their sense of self. (shrink)

More than four years ago I ventured to put forward some ideas about the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein. The publication, within the last year or two, of a number of important books of Wittgensteiniana has seemed to offer a good occasion for reviewing this earlier essay. The present article proposes to assess these books and, in the light of them to reconsider the writer’s earlier interpretation of Wittgenstein, as well as to embark on a more ambitious study of Wittgenstein’s later (...) thought. I shall begin with some general remarks about the books in question. (shrink)

CHARLES LESLIE STEVENSON, Associate Professor of Philosophy in the University of Michigan, though an American, has an important place in the evolution of British ethics in this century. It was in Mind that his first papers on ethics were published in 1937-8. They had considerable influence in Britain in promoting the emotive-persuasive theory of moral language. The author of the theory that much of philosophy and ethics is persuasive rhetoric, was himself a plausible illustration of his own theory. His breeziness (...) of style seemed to sweep difficulties out of the way. His papers had an unconventionality which appealed all the more to the younger generation of philosophers because it shocked the older. He seemed to discredit critics by not appearing able to understand the archaic language they were talking. The ideas of these early papers were taken up into a book, Ethics and Language published in 1944. The book is more ponderous and indeed somewhat pedantic. In it, Stevenson’s ideas lose in freshness what they gain in professorial gravity. But the impressive size of the book, the number and variety of the examples of moral argument which it discussed, the apparently wide range of the treatment, made the book for some time a sort of bible of emotivism. The book was also important as the first major study of ethics based on the neo-Wittgensteinian slogan that moral philosophy is the analysis of moral language. (shrink)

IT IS SHOWN IN DETAIL THAT RECENT ACCOUNTS FAIL TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN INTENTIONALITY AND MERELY CAUSALLY DISPOSITIONAL STATES OF INORGANIC PHYSICAL OBJECTS—A QUICK ROAD TO PANPSYCHISM. THE CLEAR NEED TO MAKE SUCH A DISTINCTION GIVES DIRECTION FOR FUTURE WORK. A BEGINNING IS MADE TOWARD PROVIDING SUCH AN ACCOUNT.

Berit Brogaard and Joe Salerno (Counterfactuals and Context, ANALYSIS 68 (2008): 39-46) argue that the standard Stalnaker-Lewis counterexamples to hypothetical syllogism, strengthening the antecedent, and contraposition trade on a failure to hold fixed the context in which truth values are determined for the premises and conclusion in each counterexample. I argue that no contextual fallacy is committed in the standard counterexamples, and I offer a different view of what it is for a fact to be held fixed by a counterfactual (...) antecedent. On my view, for a fact to be held fixed is an epistemological matter, not a semantic matter. (shrink)

Too much is claimed for this book by its title and by the blurb. The essays published in it were prepared in connection with a course of lectures, organized by the British Council, for non-British philosophy teachers, and held at Peterhouse, Cambridge, in the summer of 1953. The course was a good one; but it did not amount to an adequate picture of British Philosophy in 1953; and it is too much to claim that “it is not only an authoritative (...) review of some of the outstanding recent developments in British Philosophy, but also a significant contribution to these developments.” As a record of what the most vocal British philosophers are saying to-day, it is not so helpful as the less pretentious B.B.C. and Oxford symposia, The Revolution in Philosophy, and The Nature of Metaphysics. As a guide to what is going on in British philosophy to-day, it compares very unfavourably with H. D. Lewis’s symposium, Contemporary British Philosophy. (shrink)

In both the literal and metaphorical senses, it seemed as if 1970s America was running out of gas.

Mr. Mure, the Warden of Merton, does not conceal his entire lack of sympathy with contemporary British, and particularly Oxford, philosophy. His last words are: “At present, if I had an intelligent son coming up to Oxford, I should not regret it if he turned his face away from all the three Honours Schools that include philosophy, even from Greats.” Such words are not lightly spoken by a man whose life has been bound up with philosophy and with Oxford. He (...) was University lecturer in philosophy from 1929 to 1937, and has been Warden of Merton since 1947. He has written two works on Aristotle and two on Hegel: an Introduction to Hegel and A Study of Hegel’s Logic. He obviously belongs, therefore, to a different generation and a different philosophical world from that of contemporary Oxford teachers of philosophy. Judging the latter by the standards of his own generation and tradition, he finds their work devoid of all virtue or value. (shrink)

There have in recent years been various indications of dissatisfaction with certain trends in current Oxford and Cambridge philosophy. There has been a feeling that detailed analyses of minute particulars has led to neglect of some broader and more pervasive issues. It has been realised that certain problems are distorted when isolated for analytic purposes from their living context. Thus, the problem of the self has been treated exclusively as a logical, linguistic or epistemological problem, without reference to the awareness (...) of self in moral experience. The problems of self-consciousness, of personal identity and of memory have been treated as cognitive problems, without reference to action, intention or project as modes of experience of self-continuity through time. In general, philosophy of mind has been separated from philosophy of morals. In turn, philosophy of morals has been developed as if it had to do with ‘stands’ or decisions not with reasoning; or as if it concerned the meaning of sentences, not the meaning of human life. (shrink)

This book represents the text of six lectures delivered by Canon Van Steenberghen in the Queen’s University, Belfast in May 1953, under the auspices of the Department of Scholastic Philosophy. As an introduction to the evolution of philosophical thought in the thirteenth century, it could hardly be bettered. It not merely states conclusions; it communicates the excitement of intellectual enquiry and discovery. It is a report of work in progress, with the challenge of work still remaining to be done. It (...) makes the reader participant of an absorbing debate, in which the author joins issue with eminent medieval scholars in elucidating some central problems of the history of scholasticism and their relevance to contemporary Thomism. The debate continues; but on many points the reader will have no doubt that Professor Van Steenberghen’s theses are définitivement acquises. (shrink)

The paper interprets Peirce's philosophy as a critical revival of Kant's idea of transcendental philosophy. The paper adopts, clarifies and extends the Peirce interpretation of the German philosopher K O Apel. In so doing, it shows Peirce to have articulated insights into meaning, knowledge and truth still of relevance today and to have identified important problems to which he proposed novel and still instructive solutions. (edited).

'Why did the window break when it was hit by the stone? Because the window is brittle and the stone is hard; hardness and brittleness are powers, dispositional properties or dispositions.' Dispositions are essential to our understanding of the world. This book is a record of the debate on the nature of dispositions between three distinguished philosophers - D. M. Armstrong, C. B. Martin and U. T. Place - who have been thinking about dispositions all their working lives. Their distinctive (...) accounts cover many of the issues surrounding dispositions such as the nature of mind, matter, universals, existence, laws of nature and causation. Dispositions illuminates this central topic in analytic philosophy and at the same time highlights deeper concerns of metaphysics. (shrink)